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Perpetuities, Privity and Professional Liability
D. ORvmim

LAY

Caveat: Every attorney at law shall be liable to his client
for any damage sustained by him by the neglect
of his duty as such attorney. Va. Code Ann. 1950
§54-46 (Repl. Vol. 1958).

As the number of malpractice cases against members
of all professions continues to increase, it seems appropriate to review several new developments which
may be of considerable importance to the practicing lawyer with respect to his professional liability. The time
has come to approach this delicate subject with some
plain language about property law and the portentous
responsibility of the legal profession in the context of
the rule against perpetuities.
The liability of a lawyer for malpractice has long been
sustained by the common law. The earliest cases were
reported in England almost two hundred years ago
wherein it was first established that a solicitor (attorney) was liable for his "culpable negligence" in the
practice of law. At the same time, those early cases
granted exoneration to a barrister (counsel) from all
liability, and held that neither solicitors nor barristers
were called upon to respond in damages for their mere
professional "mistakes." Apparently on the theory that
no member of the legal profession could be charged with
a knowledge of all of the law, many lawyers then escaped
liability for their incompetence. Such is not the status
of the law today, and any lawyer may be held personally
liable for the loss he causes by a mere mistake. It is
suggested that a misunderstanding or a mistake in the
modern practice of law can be as costly to the twentiethcentury lawyer as was his "culpable negligence" two
centuries ago. A rather recent case portends this ominous
possibility.

204

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

It happened in California. An attorney had practiced
law in the community for more than forty years after
graduation from a well-known law school. His legal education had followed undergraduate technical studies
and the award of an engineering degree from a large
state university. He was probably a typical general
practitioner with many years experience in the ramifications of property law, testamentary disposition, and estate planning. With this commendable professional background, he was made the defendant in a suit seeking $90,000. in damages for malpractice, breach of contract in
drafting a will, and negligence in the handling of an
estate. The trouble began when this attorney entered
into an oral contract with a client to draft a will. It appeared that he had served as counsel to this client for
about thirty years, was thoroughly familiar with the
client's estate, and understood the client's desire and
direction that the plaintiffs were to receive specified portions of his estate. The will thereafter drafted and executed by the client contained a clause creating a residual
testamentary trust in which the plaintiffs were named
beneficiaries and provided that: "This trust shall cease
and terminate at 12 o'clock noon on a day five years
after the date upon which the order distributing the
trust property to the trustee is made by the Court having jurisdiction over the probation of this will."
Shortly after the death of the client-testator, the will
was admitted to probate and certain interested persons
(blood relatives of the testator) instituted action to contest its validity. The same attorney, representing the
executors, settled this dispute with the contesting parties whereby, for the payment of an agreed sum of $10,000., the contest would be dismissed and appropriate releases executed by the contestants. The releases thereafter prepared by the attorney and duly executed by the
contestants apparently failed to preclude the same con-
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testants from making another subsequent attack on the
specific clause in the will that created the residuary
trust. In the malpractice action there was evidence that
these releases had been approved by the court but that
the attorney had failed to advise the court that their efficacy had been challenged by other counsel to whom
they had been submitted for review and opinion.
The ultimate result was a further attack by the same
contestants, this time directed at the validity of the
clause that purported to create the residuary trust. The
basis for the alleged invalidity was the rule against
perpetuities. Once again the same attorney negotiated a
compromise settlement, coupled with an apparent admission that the clause in question was indeed invalid
under that rule. After explaining to the intended beneficiaries (the plaintiffs in the malpractice action) that they
would be deprived of their entire inheritance because of
the rule against perpetuities, he proceeded to suggest a
$75,000. settlement with the blood relatives of the testator, the contestants, pointing out to the beneficiaries that
their inheritance of the trust property would thereby be
reduced by that amount. It seems strange that the contestant blood relatives of the testator accepted this compromise; but they did, and their attack on the clause,
founded on the rule against perpetuities, was also dismissed.
After all contests were concluded by negotiation and
compromise, the intended beneficiaries of the residuary
trust brought suit against the attorney seeking to recover $75,000. damages for malpractice and breach of
contract to draft the will for the testator, and to recover
an additional $15,000. damages founded on negligence
in the drafting of releases concerned with the first attack
on the validity of the will itself. The defendant-lawyer
interposed a demurrer which was sustained by the trial
court. However, the plaintiffs appealed and the inter-
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mediate California appellate court, finding adequate
facts necessary to constitute a cause of action, remanded
the case to the trial court. Lucas v. Hamm., 11 Cal. Rptr.
727 (1961). Thereafter, the defendant-lawyer carried an
appeal on the order of remand to the highest court of the
state where he finally prevailed, and the judgment of the
trial court sustaining his demurrer was affirmed. Lucas
v. Hamm, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P. 2d 685 (1961). In that
portion of the opinion concerned with the attorney's alleged negligence in considering the rule against perpetuities when drafting the will, there is no doubt that
the Supreme Court of California went to extremes to
rescue the legal profession from a precarious area of
professional liability. However, at the same time the
court introduced and established an entirely new base
for such an action and departed from several centuries
of precedent as to the foundation for malpractice actions
against attorneys.
It has been long established that the liability of a lawyer for negligence originates in the contractual relationship between the lawyer and his client. With this foundation in contract law, an action against an attorney has
been said to spring from an implied promise by the lawyer to render services equated in terms of care, skill and
knowledge to the standard of negligence. Therefore,
whether or not such an action sounds in tort is not
material, even though the action is necessarily based at
its outset on the contractual relationship. Indeed, more
than a century ago, it was suggested in England with reference to "actions against attorneys, surgeons and other
professional men, for want of competent skill or proper
care in the service they undertake to render" that such
actions spring out of privity of contract between the
parties but that the remedy for a breach thereof may
sound either in contract or tort. Boorman v. Brown, 3
Q. B. 511, 525, 114 Eng. Rep. 603, 608 (1842). Therefore,

PERPETUITIES, PRIVITY, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

207

the cornerstone for any malpractice action has long been
laid in a contractual setting, with "privity of contract"
as the legal concept holding it in place. Absent "privity
of contract," no such action for damages could be

brought.
The requirement for "privity of contract" between attorney and client as the basis for a malpractice action
was established in this country by the United States
Supreme Court in a leading case that came up from the
District of Columbia. Therein, action was brought by a
banking institution against an attorney who it was alleged had negligently examined a real property title.
A borrower who claimed ownership of the property had
engaged the attorney to search its title and then presented the attorney's certificate of title to mortgage
brokers employed by the borrower to negotiate a loan.
The brokers proceeded to obtain the loan from the plaintiff bank, and the evidence showed that the attorney had
no relationship, no "privity of contract" whatsoever,
with either the brokers or the bank. Upon ultimate default and attempted foreclosure, it was discovered that
the borrower had no title to the property, having previously made a valid conveyance in fee simple by a recorded deed. The bank then attempted to recover its loss
in a malpractice action against the attorney. In affirming
the judgment of the trial court in favor of the attorneydefendant, Justice Clifford found no difficulty in sustaining the attorney's liability for negligence, but held that
the bank could not recover because the attorney's obligation to use reasonable care and skill in the performance
of his services was to his client, and not to a third party.
With citations to several English cases, the gravamen
of the court's conclusion was that an attorney was not
liable for negligence to anyone with whom the attorneyclient contractual relationship does not in some manner
exist. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25
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L. Ed. 621 (1880). The opinion, however, was not unanimous. Chief Justice Waite, in a rather brief but forceful dissent, expressed the viewpoint that the attorney
should be liable to anyone who he knows or ought to
know would use his certificate of title in a business transaction. In substance, the dissent suggested that the absence of "privity of contract" should not shield the
lawyer from liability for his own lack of ordinary professional care and skill.
The Virginia statute presented as a headnote to this
commentary, and its almost identical counterpart in
West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. §2860 (1961)], by the
phrase "to his client" would seem only to spell out the
existing common law to the effect that where there is
privity of contract an attorney is liable for his neglect
of duty. Even if such liability as indicated by these
statutes is resolved on the basis of tort law, the underlying duty to use care is based on a lawyer's implied
promise to exercise a degree of knowledge and skill in
keeping with the standards of his profession. Furthermore, even in the absence of a binding attorney-client
contract, an early Virginia case held that where an attorney's services were gratuitously rendered he was still
liable for his negligence. Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 203
(Va. 1796).
In the context of medical malpractice, it has long been
established that the physician-patient relationship is the
essential foundation for the action, a relationship that
imposes a duty on the physician to exercise care, skill
and diligence in the services rendered to his patient.
Although the nature of the professional duty, and the
liability for neglect thereof, seems to be pretty much the
same for both the physician-patient relationship and the
attorney-client relationship, the existence of privity of
contract has never been significant as a requirement for
a medical malpractice action. Indeed, many physician-
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patient relationships come into existence where the contract employing the physician is made by a family member, or some other person, for the benefit of a third-party
patient in whose behalf the services are to be rendered.
In one such case, a physician-radiologist who never even
had seen the claimant-patient was held liable for negligent interpretation of X-ray films, there being a total
absence of privity between him and the claimant. Harvey
v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N. W. 2d 483 (1942). Many
such cases never reach the appellate courts and are decided against the physician without any consideration
as to the absence or presence of privity of contract with
the patient. Why should it be any different when an attorney is the defendant in an action founded on alleged
legal malpractice?
It is both interesting and significant to review the
process of reasoning by which the California court
jumped the privity barrier in Lucas v. Hamm, supra, and
-in so doing overruled an earlier California case which
had applied what it referred to as "the stringent privity
test." [cf. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900, 31
L.R.A. 862 (1895)]. First, the court considered a matter
of policy as to the extent to which the transaction was
designed to benefit the plaintiff-beneficiaries of the
residuary trust, and proceeded to find that one of the
principal objects of the attorney-client relationship as
created to draft the testator's will was to provide for a
testamentary gift of the property to the plaintiffs. Then,
contemplating the foreseeability of loss of the property
to the plaintiffs, the court suggested that the prospective
loss arising out of the invalidity of the bequest because
of the rule against perpetuities was "clearly" foreseeable by the attorney. Next, directing its approach to the
proximity between the attorney's conduct and the plaintiff's loss, the court found that when the testator died
and the will was offered for probate, it then became a
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certainty that the plaintiffs would have received the intended benefits had it not been for the negligence of the
attorney. Finally, with the obvious objective to establish
precedent, the court concluded that if the plaintiffs were
not allowed to recover for their loss because of the attorney's negligence, no one would be able to do so and
the policy of preventing future harm would be impaired.
It would seem apparent that the California court established and applied principles of tort law to circumvent
the old, and perhaps obsolete, concepts of privity of contract inherent in the attorney-client relationship. It is
submitted that this approach could be similarly applicable in Virginia and West Virginia, and could be maintained outside and apart from the statutory pronouncements of the old common law liability for legal malpractice.
The fact that the defendant-attorney did prevail in
Lucas v. Hamm, supra, and was rescued by the California court from the very brink of financial disaster is
interesting, but the court's reasoning was far from conclusive. The attorney's salvation rested solely on the
grounds that the court was unwilling to include an applicable knowledge of the rule against perpetuities as
being within the requisite standards for the professional
skill of an attorney. Such judicial protection for a fellowmember of the legal profession seems to be entirely without justification. It introduces a foul odor in the output
of the fountain of justice and will inevitably evaporate
in the arena of public opinion. There seems to be no
sound reason why an attorney should be exonerated from
liability for neglect of duty where he has failed to consider the impact of such a fundamental principle of
property law as the rule against perpetuities in the
drafting of a client's will.
It has been seven years since this author undertook
to explore in depth the subject of Virginia's DrearAridi-
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ties: Its Rule of Perpetuities and proclaim a new era
of paradoxical absurdities with the rule -against perpetuities. 1 U. Rich. L. N. 123 (1959). Absurd as they
may be, the lassic cases of the "unborn widow," the
"fertile octogenerian," the "fertile decedent," and the
"magic gravel pit" could still arise under Virginia's
rule, with the additional complications where the "all
or nothing" impact of class gifts is applied under the
"take effect" doctrine of Virginia rather than the "vesting" concept of the common law rule. As long as Virginia's own rule against perpetuities continues to
flourish without adoption of a complete cy pres concept,
or the more modest "wait and see" approach of Pennsylvania, it is submitted that the professional liability of
an attorney could be established upon negligence in his
failure to understand and properly apply the rule. It
could happen under the identical facts of the California
case by way of a very elementary aspect of the "might
have been" application of the rule.
Within the facts of Lucas v. Hamm from California,
supra, the attorney's mistake was the inclusion in his
client's will of a clause by which it was provided that a
residuary trust was to terminate "on a day five years
after the date upon which the order distributing the trust
property to the trustee is made by the court." Under the
"might have been" operation of the rule against perpetuities, there was no certainty that the five year period of time would start to run from a date that would
cause the trust to terminate within the established period
of the rule. The distant possibility that the order of the
court distributing the trust property might be entered at
a remote date with the result that the trust would terminate and distribution of the trust property be made
to the plaintiff-beneficiaries outside the period of the
rule, created the total invalidity of the gift by way of
the "all or nothing" impact of the rule, and the benefic-
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iaries would have taken nothing had they not compromised their contest for the sum of $75,000. There is,
therefore, no reason to wonder why the beneficiaries
sued the lawyer for $75,000. plus an additional $15,000.
for his ineptitude in handling the releases of the original will contest.
The affirmative "might have been" impact of the rule
against perpetuities is basically applied in a "might not
have been" negative type of application of the rule
where a so-called type of "administrative contingency"
is present as in the instant case. Such clauses all too
frequently appear in wills and trust instruments and
provide for distribution of property "when debts are
paid", "when the will is probated," or "when the estate
is settled." Such clauses look innocent enough and indicate that the distribution of the property shall be made
following a natural legal course of events. While they
certainly do not, in themselves, usually import any contingency on the vesting of interest in the named beneficiaries, they certainly do contemplate a postponement of
enjoyment, a delay in the Virginia concept of "taking
effect" in possession. Therefore, such clauses will invalidate the entire gift under a rule of property law such
as the rule against perpetuities, even though the resulting invalidity is entirely contrary to the express intent
of the testator or settlor. Therefore, should it constitute
neglect of professional duty where a lawyer either does
not know, does not understand, or fails to foresee the
impact of the rule against perpetuities when drafting a
will or trust? The California court concluded that it did
not, but reached that conclusion by some strange reasoning. It looked forward and backward at the same time,
forward as to the elimination of the privity requirement,
backward as to what comprised negligence on the part
of an attorney.
Concerning itself with its own rule against perpetui-
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ties as founded in the -common law and modified by stat.utes, the court commented to the effect that few, if any,
areas of the law have been fraught with more confusion
.or concealed more traps for the unwary draftsman, that
every segment of the legal profession is prone to make
errors in matters concerning the rule, and that the statutory enactments of California amending the common
law rule had added further complexities for the bar.
Then, examining in particular the invalid clause of the
testator's will that prompted the malpractice action, the
court concluded that an attorney of ordinary skill might
have "fallen into the net which the rule spreads for the
unwary," thus failing to recognize its invalidity, and
that it would not be proper to hold the defendant liable
for failure to use "such skill, prudence and diligence as
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise." This, in substance, suggests that a lawyer should
not be held'liable for a loss sustained by testamentary
beneficiaries that could have been far in excess of $75,000. as caused by negligence in drafting a client's will,
merely because the particular rule of law which he
should have been familiar with as a lawyer-the rule
against perpetuities-is a difficult subject in the law of
property. This might be compared to a suggestion that a
physician-surgeon is not liable for malpractice where he
negligently performs a very difficult operation, such as
brain surgery, on his patient, for the reason that such an
operation is considered very complex in the medical profession. However, by this reasoning, the court thus relieved the attorney from liability on the grounds that the
rule against perpetuities is too difficult for the ordinary
lawyer and that it only constitutes negligence where a
lawyer fails to exercise professional skill in the practice
of law involving "easy" legal principles. Such reasoning cannot long endure. In addition to the impossibility
of differentiating between what is "easy" and what is
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"difficult" in the practice of any profession, it would
seem that one who is duly licensed to practice law owes
a duty to the public either to know every subject of the
law in his field of practice, or to acquire that requisite
knowledge in the process of serving a client, or to associate some other member of the bar who does have that
knowledge. Failure to employ any of these alternatives
should constitute actionable neglect of duty.
What are the requisite standards by which the professional duty of an attorney might be circumscribed? If
there are any such standards, they can be found only in
the cases that have been decided in the past. In 1890,
the Virginia court suggested that a lawyer's duty was
"to give his client the benefit of his best judgment, advice,
and exertions." (emphasis added) Thomas v. Turner, 87
Va. 1, 12, 12 S. E. 149, 168 (1890). A much later case suggested that in his relations with his client, a lawyer's
duty is "to exercise and maintain the utmost good faith,
integrity, fairness and fidelity." Byars v. Stone, 186 Va.
518, 529, 42 S. E. 2d 847, 852 (1947). A rather recent
case imposes upon Virginia lawyers the duty to "execute the business intrusted to their professional management with a reasonable degree of care, skill and dispatch" and goes on to explain that .an attorney "is not
bound to extraordinary diligence, but only to use a reasonable degree of care and skill" with respect to the
character of the business he undertakes to handle, and
"is not answerable for every error or mistake." Glenn
v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S. E. 2d 509, 26 A. L. R. 2d
1334 (1951). In a somewhat similar vein, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia has indicated that
"an attorney owes to his client the high duty to diligently, faithfully, and legitimately perform every act necessary to protect, conserve, and advance the interest of
his client." Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn Coal Corp.,
133 W. Va. 639, 57 S. E. 2d 736 (1950). To adopt a phrase
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coined by the late Justice Cardozo, these decisions leave
us "without compass" as to the extent of a lawyer's
,professional duty and bring us back to the broad scope
of the viewpoint expressed by Dean Wade of the Vanderbilt University Law School, to the effect that the lawyer's duty is "to use care and skill and to display requisite legal knowledge." Wade, The Attorney's L'iability
For Negligence, 12 VA D. L. REv. 755, 757 (1959). If it
is proper to conclude that the significance of "privity of
contract" has lapsed, the phrase "to his client" in these
cases is no longer meaningful and it is logical to conclude
that "requisite legal knowledge" includes the use of
care, skill and legal knowledge in the drafting of instruments in such a way as to avoid invalidity in whole or in
part because of the rule against perpetuities. If the time
has not yet arrived for this conclusion, there are many
who believe that it will arrive in the future. As Professor Leach of Harvard Law School has indicated,
courts outside California may soon leap the privity
hurdle, and everywhere conclude that elementary acquaintance with the rule against perpetuities is a requirement for those members of the profession who engage in this branch of practice. Leach, Perpetuities:The
Nutshell Revisited, 78 HA~nv. L. Rr.v. 973, 987 (1965).
One available defense against a legal malpractice action arising out of mishandling of the rule against perpetuities may be available under the statute of limitations, and thereunder the applicable statutory period
will usually vary as between contract and tort actions.
Since the period for actions on a contract is often of
longer duration, the plaintiff may elect to treat his action as sounding in contract, and this has been sustained
where the plaintiff has clearly indicated such an intent.
Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S. W. 2d 377 (1955).
However, as the old essential for privity of contract
evaporates, it is proper for a court to conclude that a
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legal malpractice action sounds in tort, the same as does
a medical malpractice action, and that the statute of
limitations applicable to wrongful acts or negligence
should apply. Alter v. Michael, 48 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1965).
It is suggested, nevertheless, that the application of the
appropriate statute of limitations is secondary to the
problem of when the statutory period begins to run.
The start of the running of the statutory period of
limitations has long been unsettled in legal malpractice
actions. Some of the older cases held that the time should
date from the time of the attorney's alleged negligent
conduct, while others have measured the time more
logically from the date that the plaintiff sustained actual
damages. Where an attorney has so drafted a will or
trust instrument that one or more beneficiaries will not
take the property because of his carelessness in considering the potential impact of the rule against perpetuities, the actual loss to the beneficiaries may not become reasonably ascertainable until many years have
elapsed from the date the professional services were
rendered. As the actions for legal malpractice continue
to approach and identify themselves with medical malpractice actions, there is an obvious trend away from
measuring the period of the statute of limitations from
the date of the alleged act of negligence. Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh, 215 A. 2d 825 (Md. 1966). In this recent case
from Virginia's neighboring state involving alleged medical malpractice, the court held that the plaintiff's right
of action should accrue from the time that the patient
first knows or should know that he has suffered injury
or damage. The reasoning therein, to the effect that in
all malpractice cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for
a layman to reasonably understand that harm has befallen him until long after the act of negligence has been
committed, is as logically applicable under a will or trust
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drafted by a lawyer as it is with respect to a physician's
services to a patient.
There is some speculation that the suggested trend
will not be followed in Virginia, and that the recent
case of Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 145 S. E. 2d 187
(1966) is out of step with Virginia's neighboring states.
That medical malpractice case can be distinguished on
the facts because there was evidence therein that the
plantiff should have known of the possible existence of
the alleged malpractice shortly after the surgery was
performed by the defendant-physician. Seventeen years
had elapsed between the alleged negligent act or acts of
the physician and the date on which the plaintiff's action
was instituted. The court was probably correct in its
conclusion that such delay should not have tolled the running of the statute of limitations because the plaintiff's
physical condition immediately after the operation indicated possible neglect of professional duty in the physician's failure to make a skillful diagnosis of the plaintiff-patient's post-operative complaints. Without any
prior Virginia malpractice cases as controlling, the court
reached for authority in the normal type of personal injury cases and was unwilling to adopt the indicated trend
that as recently as 1965 had been followed in West Virginia, another neighboring state. Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 144 S. E. 2d 156 (W. Va. 1965). The Virginia
decision also relied in part upon textual authority quoted
from §13.06, Louisell and Williams, TRIAL OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CAsEs

369 (1960), and in quoting somewhat

out of context with the entire section seems to have overlooked the authors' introductory comment which pointed
out that "the theory of the plaintiff's case . . . will often
determine which facts are the significant ones that cause
the statute to begin to run." supra, p. 368. Furthermore,
the court seems to have given no consideration to its
quoted text which suggests that the more antiquated
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majority rule has been applied only "in the absence of
special circumstances that are common to various types
of cases." Certainly, the fundamental theory that supports a plaintiff's legal malpractice case, coupled with
special circumstances peculiar to a lawyer's professional
skill in considering the rule against perpetuities, should
come within this exception to toll the running of the
statute of limitations until such time as the plaintiff
knows or should reasonably know of the loss precipitated
by the attorney's neglect of duty.
CONCLUSION
The statutory caveat in the headnote to this commentary seems therefore to be much broader in scope than
might first appear from a casual glance. It is herein concluded that the professional liability of a lawyer may
now extend to anyone who sustains damages arising out
of professional services negligently rendered, and that
such liability is not necessarily limited by such a statute
solely "to his client"; it is further concluded that "neglect of duty" by an attorney may include negligence in
the handling of both "easy" and "difficult" problems of
law, it being agreed by almost every member of the profession that the rule against perpetuities belongs in the
latter category.

